

Public Concerns of Illegal Immigration and Ideology

A Senior Honors Thesis

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By

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Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the "images of the world" created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.

–Max Weber<sup>1</sup>

How does affective response to Hispanics relate to restrictionist border policy proposals? I argue a form of ideologically mediated pro- or anti-Hispanic affect better explains restrictionist sentiment than a variety of competing theories of immigration politics. Such alternative viewpoints include the realistic threat hypothesis, the “security dilemma” framework, “principled conservatism,” and finally, symbolic racism originating from the protestant ethic and unfiltered negative affect toward Hispanics. In contrast to these theories that take up structural features of economics, interethnic conflict, or disputes of ideology as the cause of insecurity, I argue that ideology acts as an enabling device that determines whether the negative affect will result in certain justifications for restrictionist immigration policy.

Insecurity, a primary affective correlate of restrictionist sentiment, comes in several forms, and it is often difficult to draw significant lines. We feel insecure when approached by a stranger, hear of a newly discovered virus, or find ourselves with the specter of unemployment. Fear is famously disproportional to the probability of the threat, we fear shark attacks but not undertow, snipers on the highway but not distracted drivers. Certain phenomena trigger a psychological response that make the rational calculation of threat more difficult, and can influence even the perception of the size of threat in the first place. Measuring the perceived size of a threat therefore runs into a

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<sup>1</sup> 29 Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, trans. Marianne Weber (Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, 1920), p. 252

problem, if it is perceived, it will probably be exaggerated, thus confounding attempts to demonstrate the relative urgency of response to assuage the threat in the first point.

Recently, scholars have rushed to explain both the increased feelings of insecurity related to the status or intent of undocumented immigrants, America's southern border, the success of immigrant assimilation and cultural issues. One strain of argument centers on a conception of racial relations framed in zero-sum relationships of power or interest. Such scholars argue that structural features of societies that limit enforcement of agreements encourage insecurity. The 'security dilemma' framework is not opposed to but rather along side explanations of immigration policy preferences that rely on ideology, group identity, or current material interests. The 'security dilemma' emphasis on threats to individuals security, posits that particular groups of immigrants are targeted because of their perceived propensity to cause a breakdown in the state.

In Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, Mikhail Alexseev<sup>2</sup> explains fear of immigration by appeal to rational decision making on the part of the incumbent population. Alexseev noticed a tendency to exaggerate and strongly respond to threats even in contexts of marginal immigration, which indicates that anti-immigrant sentiment is not be explained by conflict over resources or similar population based threats. Instead, it is the expectation of future interaction that results in exaggerated threat of conflict, hence a dilemma where we have an exaggerated threat that arrives from rational expectation.

The "security dilemma" conceptualization of threat, which de-couples perceived physical insecurity from its "putative symbolic and realistic correlates", identifies the

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<sup>2</sup> Alexeev, Mikhail A. Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma 2006 Cambridge University Press.

structural causes of fear of immigrants.<sup>3</sup> Alexseev uses Weingast's "reciprocal vulnerability game" which stipulates that in situations of approximately equal group size and political power, there is a lack of credible commitment to cooperate because of incentives to break any agreements and the propensity to act selfishly. Alexeev argues that regardless of the non-equality of the populations involved, there cannot be any credible commitment on the side of the incoming migrants not to "defect" and play offensive strategies, Americans rightly (rationally) suspect them and establish the incoming migrants as threatening.<sup>4</sup> This suspicion instantiates itself in the perception of illegal immigrant disloyalty, unfaithfulness and increased concern about terrorism.<sup>5</sup>

The perception of threat from the 'sucker's payoff' increases with the lack of contract enforcement, for example when the state is relatively weak. Similar to a Hobbesian theory of human nature, this claim also comports with literature on threat construction and exaggeration, often applied to international relations. Rather than an iterated game, as interactions of citizens under a stable government would be, migrants are a series of 'one shot games'. "The shadow of doubt is perpetually there, as long as any given migrant- regardless of past behavior – has a plausible incentive to break the pattern of cooperative ("defensive") behavior."<sup>6</sup> Human nature, being risk-averse, exaggerates this threat into something requiring policy response.

The security dilemma explains fear of objectively marginal immigration populations, and Alexeev analyzes the race relations within the United States during the racial conflict in Southern California during the early 1990's. With the immigration

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<sup>3</sup> Alexeev, Mikhail A. Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma 2006 pg 27.

<sup>4</sup> Alexeev, Mikhail A. Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma 2006 pg 54.

<sup>5</sup> Alexeev, pg 55.

<sup>6</sup> Alexeev pg 54.

population under question hardly marginal, increasingly in central and northern states, it is a legitimate question whether the security dilemma applies.<sup>7</sup> The perception of threat posed by the obscured intent of the migrants would presumably increase with rapid population increases that result from the current migration trends.

There are several features of the current migration situation that may even encourage these phenomena. The feeling of lack of control, like the feeling of a lack of order, generates anxiety. People are therefore more likely to exaggerate risks when those risks are beyond their control.<sup>8</sup> This is particularly applicable today given the failure to control the global economic system. In addition, the proximity of underdeveloped states such as Mexico makes the southern border particularly troubling. However, it is important to keep in mind, that these conceptions need not accurately reflect the situation. It is more important that the conceptions be coherent and provide sufficient explanations for social phenomena, but not so important for them to comport with an actual lack in state authority.

Former Security official and author Robert Johnson developed a theory which predicts that actual authority status may not influence the choice of security threats, but rather the subjective perception of the threatening group. Threats originating from places outside the established ordered and developed world have long been focal points of analysis of international relations. “Analysts have usually argued or assumed that the elements of order in the world emanated from European civilization while the rest of the world was exotic and mysterious at best and a zone of cruelty and perpetual chaos at

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<sup>7</sup> Reuters “Illegal immigrants increasingly go north” Jan 15, 2008 Robin Emmott

<sup>8</sup> Johnson. R. Improbable Dangers, U.S. conceptions of Threat in the Cold War 1997 Pg. 16

worst.”<sup>9</sup> This kind of analysis is not limited to the ivory tower; in recent hearings held by the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on security in the southern border, argued that “It’s not clear that the groups who are moving any kind of illegal traffic, whether it be human, narcotics, terrorist or anything else, behave in zones [sic] like we behave.”<sup>10</sup> This rhetoric, common from the Cold War to the Global War on Terror, highlights fear of the non-European world. Is this conception of world order a ‘security dilemma or a false dilemma driven by racial and ethnic prejudice?

According to security dilemma theories, ‘zones of insecurity’ and lack of control are (legitimately or not) treated as military threats. Alexeev cites Patrick Buchanan: “the reconquista of Alta California by Mexico is well advanced and the great question is now on the table. Will the American Southwest become a giant Kosovo...”<sup>11</sup> But why focus on illegal immigrants primarily from a state that cannot compete militarily, economically or socially with the United States on the world stage. In Weber’s words, what are the ‘switches’ which turn general anxiety upon illegal immigrant populations? The Security Dilemma logic would suggest that it is the perceived inherent unpredictability of populations without prior behavior or history to placate concern.

I propose that the perceived threat from illegal immigrants arises from an ideologically mediated affective response to the ethnic and racial makeup of the incoming population, rather than inability to commit to future behavior. On this hypothesis, assenting to restrictionist arguments for limiting or eliminating illegal immigration would be highly correlated with affective attitudes about Hispanics. Current population trends

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<sup>9</sup> Holsti K. J. The coming chaos? Armed conflict in the world’s periphery” International Order and the Future of World Politics, 1999 Cambridge Edited by T. V. Paul and John A. Hall. Pg. 283

<sup>10</sup> Rep. Simmons, “Panel I Of A Hearing Of The Subcommittee On Intelligence, Information Sharing, And Terrorism Risk Assessment Of The House Committee On Homeland Security” June 28, 2006

<sup>11</sup> Buchanan Patrick Pg. 12

demonstrate that Latino immigrants are a considerable force in American racial relations. Now the nation's largest minority group, Latinos accounted for one half of the overall population growth of 2.9 million between 2003 and 2004. The Census Bureau estimates there were 41.3 million Latinos in the United States as of July 2004.<sup>12</sup> Despite the non-trivial political and social implications of large shifts in population, I contend racial prejudice holding constant material concerns and ideology drive the restrictionist sentiment in regards to illegal immigration.

Symbolic racism theory argues positions on policy regarding race relations originate in a blend of racial affect and conservative values, particularly individualism. Does symbolic racism explain the threat perceived from illegal immigrants? I argue a similar construction of ideology and anti-illegal and anti-Hispanic affect determines the strength of threat to culture. Namely, having ideology subsidizes the search for a cover for expressing racial affect. If Alexseev is correct and this affect is a response to the perceived threat of the overthrow of the power maintained by the status quo white majority, then perception of the rate of immigrant takeover would correlate positively with perceived threat to culture.

Alexseev has two potential responses to this line of reasoning. Population is not necessarily a feature of his analysis of the 'security dilemma', as marginal immigration populations primarily motivate his study. Further, in many cases where population trends tangibly threaten the majority status of ethnic incumbents, they do not necessarily engender hostility and violence. Second, he seeks to avoid some of the methodological issues highlighted during the 1990's about the measurement of symbolic racism.

Symbolic threat "defined as threat to group identity – and this term would encompass all

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<sup>12</sup> LeMay, Michael C. Guarding the Gates Immigration and National Security. 2006 pg. 255

the opinion measures that in the Kinder/Sears-Sniderman/Tetlock debate would relate primarily to either symbolic or old-fashioned racism.”<sup>13</sup> I argue that this, perhaps crude measure, will be more successful than security dilemma claims.

Immigration phobia arises in cases of marginal migration, what is the role of population in threat formation? First it is unclear that population can be ruled out as an important factor in threat construction, the Alexseev’s examples of the UAE, Kuwait and Oman notwithstanding. Alexseev used the outbreak of violence as the dependent variable, rather than opinion polling, to argue that rapid population shifts are not the defining feature of backlash to immigration. In contrast, symbolic racism theorists would argue that individuals use arguments about political ideology in replacement of outwardly anti-minority policy. Second, while it is the case that population shifts and totals are not key variable in the security dilemma hypothesis, exaggerated *perception* of shifts are key predictions to explain phobia of marginal migration. I use perception of population size and movement as a measure of the particular threat of anarchy to break out. I use exaggeration of threat as the measure because such exaggeration is one key similarity across societies where the Security dilemma logic obtains. Finally, while large populations may not always bring about threats, one of the key points of debate in the United States has been the ability to measure the population size and spread, the failure of government agencies to do so is one mark for the weakness of the federal government that explains the threat initially.

As discussed above, Alexseev’s explanation of the link between threat and immigration relies on the marginal populations’ propensity to produce anarchy, rather than their relative size. On the other hand, according to Alexseev, symbolic threats, or

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<sup>13</sup> Alexseev, M. Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma. pg. 15



threats based on group identity or racial identity, implicitly rely on relative population. He argues larger populations pose correspondingly larger threats to the actual identities regardless of threat to resources. To analyze this propensity of population estimates to determine attitude I included in my model a variable which takes the answer to following two questions:

About how many illegal immigrants do you think currently reside in the United States? '.

- 1 '100,000'
- 2 '4,000,000'
- 3 '12,000,000'
- 4 '23,000,000'
- 5 '96,000,000'
- 6 'Don't know'.

Variable labels bas10b 'BAS10B: Do you know about how many new illegal immigrants come into the U.S. each year? '.

- 1 '50,000'
- 2 '200,000'
- 3 '500,000'
- 4 '2,000,000'
- 5 '10,000,000'
- 6 'Don't know'.

I then took as data whether the answer was an overestimate or an underestimate, using the higher or lower amount as two new variables, 'Est. Illegal Here' and 'Est. Illegal Arrival' to determine the strength of the population exaggeration in the respondents, and to determine this population exaggerations correlation with responses on various levels of threat. In this model, I test fears of balkanization of culture using these estimates of population, adding the standard battery of political knowledge and education levels, in addition to a scale which measures the number of correct answers in a series of immigration question, to help delineate between incorrect answers and exaggerated answers.

## MODEL SPECIFICATION INFORMATION

Most of this paper relies on measuring the reasons people have for positions on illegal immigration. To form variables for culture, jobs, terrorism and the economy, I combined the following battery of questions into pairs, with the index being = A - B.

Law	
A	Allowing any illegal immigrants to become citizens sets a bad precedent by rewarding people for breaking the law.
B	Allowing some illegal immigrants to eventually become citizens recognizes that most of them are otherwise law-abiding neighbors.
Jobs	
A	The government should not make things worse for those struggling economically by allowing millions of illegal immigrants to compete for jobs.
B	Most illegal immigrants are highly motivated people who contribute to the economy through hard work, often in jobs that citizens do not want.
Economy	
A	We cannot afford the taxes necessary to provide services like education and health care for illegal immigrants.
B	Illegal immigrants pay taxes like the rest of us, so they should be able to get services like education and health care.
Culture	
A	If illegal immigration trends continue, English will no longer be our common language. Without a common language, the U.S. will break into separate cultures.
B	America has always been a nation of immigrants, with each new wave adding to the diversity and richness of our culture. The most recent wave of immigrants is no different.
Terrorism	
A	The large flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. makes it easy for terrorists to enter the country unchallenged.
B	Terrorism and illegal immigration are completely different issues, with completely different solutions.

The pairings above have similar subject matter, in addition to being, among the variables in question, the only possible pairings with statistically significant correlation in the correct direction, where for example question one is highly correlated with question two, it is only statistically significantly *negatively* correlated with the answers to question

eight. This pair of question one and the inverse of question eight becomes the variable for “Law.”

In order to test the relationship between exaggeration and reasons for positions on immigration, I specified a model that held age, gender, education, place of residence, household income, and knowledge about immigration and political matters constant. The choice of variables for age, education, income, economic outlook, ideology, “border state” and “living in the south” come directly from Burns and Gimpel.<sup>14</sup> The present data come from a study of deliberative behavior, and the treatment variable controls for a document of background materials on immigration that was provided to the participants in the survey.

Regression printout for "Culture"			Number of obs= 948	
			F(17, 930) = 18.64	
			Prob > F = 0.0000	
			R-squared = 0.2541	
			Adj R-squared = 0.2405	
			Root MSE = 3.4059	
	Coefficient	Std. Error	T	P> t
Overestimation of Illegal pop. Here.	0.3001	0.135779	2.21	0.027
Overestimation of Illegal pop. Incoming	0.1416	0.113917	1.24	0.214
Age in Categories	0.2727	0.081999	3.33	0.001
Hispanic Ethnicity	-2.0971	0.436984	-4.80	0.000
Household Income in Categories	-0.0261	0.029497	-0.89	0.376
Education in Categories	-0.5944	0.157859	-3.77	0.000
Live in border state	0.6031	0.226221	2.67	0.008
Live in South	0.0042	0.229611	0.02	0.986
Republican	0.5886	0.297017	1.98	0.048
Democrat	-0.6880	0.284702	-2.42	0.016

<sup>14</sup> Peter Burns; James G. Gimpel “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 2. (Summer, 2000), pp. 201-225

Ideology	0.6793	0.090354	7.52	0.000
Immigration knowledge	-0.1180	0.090393	-1.31	0.192
Political knowledge	-0.1925	0.144599	-1.33	0.183
Economic outlook for self	-0.3715	0.16859	-2.20	0.028
Economic outlook for nation	0.0534	0.169637	0.31	0.753
Treatment	-0.0557	0.227678	-0.24	0.807
Gender	0.1482	0.243079	0.61	0.542
Constant	7.3216	1.080745	6.77	0.000

As expected, responses of agreement with the statement that illegal immigrants pose a risk to culture is correlated with overestimates in the number of illegal immigrants in the U.S., but not with the relative number of those crossing the border. This seems to indicate that the dependent variable picks up what we intuitively consider

As Alexeev rightly points out in his book, and as Johnson argued in regards to the threat of communism during the cold war, anxiety ought to result in exaggeration of threat. Exaggeration of the numbers of illegal immigrants is a symptom of some underlying anxiety, but is this anxiety of resources, culture, or anarchy?

Coefficients:	Culture	Terrorism	Economy	Jobs	Law
Est. Illegal Here	0.3001*	0.3057**	0.2359	0.0657	0.3441**
Est. Illegal Arrival	0.1416	0.03112	0.1453	0.2550**	0.2001

\*\* .01

\* .05

Using the model described above with Culture, Terrorism, Economy, Jobs and Law as the dependent variable, we come up with some telling results. Terrorism, or the breakdown of borders, correlates statistically well with overestimates of the number of illegal immigrants here, whereas the question about allowing illegal immigrants to compete with American workers is correlated well with overestimates of the number of illegal immigrants who are arriving, but not the other way around.

The model with the terrorism dependent variable shows that the variance of exaggerated illegal populations in the U.S. explains part of the variance of peoples concerns about “The large flow of illegal immigrants,” and the ease of “terrorists to enter the country unchallenged.” If actual destabilization of the border was driving the exaggeration of illegal immigrant populations, a sign of fear on an issue, it would be manifest in the overestimate of the number crossing the border, but it seems the variance of perceptions of incumbent illegal population covaries with terrorism, rather than the variance of the overestimation of those coming in. I argue that these data indicate that the perception of destabilization of the border is not a result of rational consideration of population movements or even rational calculation of exaggerated population movements, but rather a problem implicating government competence within the country.

The variable measuring response to questions on jobs also highlights an unexpected direction of threat exaggeration. The Jobs variable specifically implicates the government failure, “allowing them to compete.” The question wording asks the respondent whether or not “Most illegal immigrants are highly motivated people who contribute to the economy through hard work, often in jobs that citizens do not want.” The question highlights the motivations of illegal immigrants. Were Alexseev’s thesis to apply in this case, this should correspond well with overestimates of the illegal immigrants who are in the country, as it is their future behavior or motives that cannot be guaranteed in a “reciprocal vulnerability game.” However, this is not the case, and as mentioned earlier, the overestimation of incumbent illegal populations do not correlate significantly with the jobs question.

## IDEOLOGY

The famous polymath Jules Henri Poincaré argued, “It is not nature which imposes [time and space] upon us, it is we who impose them upon nature because we find them convenient.”<sup>15</sup> That is to say that the world that we experience, and in particular space, may be subject to ‘convenient’ heuristics that help filter information and arrive at policy positions. In this regard, I argue ideology about what the role of property, citizenship, and freedom filters our affective responses to illegal immigration, which then predicts our policy positions. By implicating illegal immigrants in some sort of violation of the ideology related to personal property claims, our personal territory, our *home*, an emotional and exaggerated response may follow independent of the actual use of space or resources by the migrants. As Patrick Buchanan puts it in his book State of Emergency,

Here in America, the self-delusion about what is happening and the paralysis in the face of the crisis have no precedent. What can be said for a man who would allow his home to be invaded by strangers who demanded they be fed, clothed, housed, and granted the rights of the firstborn?<sup>16</sup>

In this highly rhetorical flourish, the threat of illegal immigrants is not being framed as a general economic cost, or a general increase in taxes that changes, say, inflation rates, but right at the heart of the matter, one’s own home and family. In a chapter entitled “Who is at the Door?” The language of personal space and immediate surroundings continues: “But millions bring no allegiance to America and remain loyal to the lands of their birth. And though they occupy more and more rooms in our home, they are not part of our family.”<sup>17</sup> The dichotomy between this land, our home and our people must be clearly defined in order to say that the immigrants are not our people and, more importantly, that

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<sup>15</sup> Valeur de la Science (The Value of Science) (1904)

<sup>16</sup> Buchanan P. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America 2006 Pg. 6

<sup>17</sup> Buchanan P. Pg. 13

they should go back to their own homes. To Buchanan, the fact that they are here means our own homes are under threat. In an example in his book, The Death of the West, an American says “I’ve lost my freedom. I can’t ever leave the house unless I have somebody watch it... We had Mexicans working on our property... Now, it’s hell...”<sup>18</sup>

Not just restrictionists use this rhetoric of homes and personal space. In a series of speeches before the elections in which he promoted liberalized immigration policy, President Bush argued that “a lot of people have come here to this country over the decades with a dream, you know. Some of them it's as simple as "I'd like to own my own house." Or, "I want to work hard so my child can go to college.”<sup>19</sup> Bush further argues that illegal immigrants often are “doing jobs Americans aren't doing, providing for their families, they own their home.”<sup>20</sup> The presumed implication is that we ought not to worry about “people who have been here for, say, a decade, who have paid their taxes and built a home and raised a family.”<sup>21</sup> Each of these claims attempts to adjudicate between certain moral or ideological positions, namely the right to individual achievement and rights unfairly won by non-citizens.

In the models that follow, I attempt to measure the role of such ideological positions by using as a measure a seven point self placement on the liberal conservative scales. Ideology is strongly correlated with every dependent variable, with conservative respondents marking that illegal immigration is more of a threat to jobs, the economy, culture, while rewarding lawbreakers and allowing terrorism. Ideology has long been a

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<sup>18</sup> Buchanan, P. The Death of the West 2002 pg. 134

<sup>19</sup> George W. Bush, “Border Security and Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” Artesia, New Mexico Immigration Federal News Service June 6, 2006

<sup>20</sup> George W. Bush. “Immigration and Border Patrol” Laredo, Texas June 6, 2006

<sup>21</sup> George W. Bush. “Border Security and Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” Omaha, Nebraska June 6, 2006

point of debate in race politics, with some arguing that it is in part a product of efforts “to legitimize the American racial hierarchy...” and further that ideological divisions are aligned by race and that controlling for it would amount to “overcontrolling” for the truly pervasive political effect of race.<sup>22</sup> This being the case, controlling for ideology in a model should only lessen the strength of the coefficients in the models, allowing a conservative measure of the interactions terms in the regression model.

Ideology is obviously important, but how does it interact with non-racial variables? Controlling for ideology, separating those who report any level of liberal, conservative and then independent, I ran an unweighted least squares regression with terrorism as the dependent variable. All three divisions had statistically significant coefficients for the responses to a question that ranked feeling toward illegal immigrants on a one to one hundred scales, a feeling thermometer. Only liberals and independents had significant coefficients for the same thermometer response regarding people on welfare. More interestingly, liberals and conservatives (but not independents) had significant coefficients for an index of political knowledge questions. However, there is a sign difference, which understandably would be the case, given that ideology has more influence if there the respondent is more politically sophisticated.

Political ideology, according to Peter Burns and James G. Gimpel, has a distinct role to play in explaining public opinion. Ideology is a conceptual tool which links policy programs into a belief system. “The terms “liberal” and “conservative” act as abstractions that define the poles on a continuum of favorable or unfavorable judgments about public policy alternatives. Ideology provides political content for events that might

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<sup>22</sup> Sears, David O. and Henry, P.J. “Symbolic Racism: A Contemporary look” *Advances in Experimental Psychology* vol. 37 2005 Pg 142-143



otherwise be evaluated in nonpolitical terms.” Those who are not “highly sophisticated reasoners” may be just expressing their feelings when marking off tendency toward liberal and conservative, rather than identifying agreement with extensive policy positions.<sup>23</sup>

I argue that those with ideological preference on the conservative/liberal scale will engage ideological filtering of affective response to Hispanics, turning racial affect into policy positions which correspond with relevant violations of that ideology. I will refer to these phenomena as ideological mediation, distinct from symbolic racism theories that center on the Protestant ethic as I will explain later. Further, this hypothesis of ethnic conflict, if properly formulated, holds more water than the Malthusian influenced realistic threat argument or the “security dilemma” framework described by Alexseev. His analysis is that symbolic threat is a function of identity distinctiveness; the intruding groups population over the population of the non-foreign born within the society in question.

The ideology in question for symbolic racism in the case of anti-black affect included notions of what the founding values that undergird American identity, in particular, values deemed valuable by the ‘conservative’ polity. Nativism, often juxtaposed with racism, claims relative advantage as a feature of membership not of a race, but of an ethnicity with long standing power in a particular region.

How these threats manifest themselves is mediated by ideological affiliations. When asked about terrorism, it seems that those without ideological affiliation do not have a statistically significant correlation between measures of anxiety and their estimation of whether there is an increased risk of terrorists or whether the solutions to

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<sup>23</sup> Peter Burns; James G. Gimpel “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 2. (Summer, 2000), pp. 201-225

terrorism and illegal immigration are “completely different.” Conversely, the anxiety of those with ideological affiliation does correlate with this question.

Partial Correlation of Anxiety with Measures of Justifications								
	All		Conservatives		Liberals		Neutral	
	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance
Law	-0.0344	0.261	-0.0303	0.587	-0.0254	0.606	-0.0422	0.447
Economy	-0.0145	0.635	-0.0637	0.254	-0.0389	0.429	0.0312	0.574
Jobs	-0.0197	0.519	0.0015	0.979	-0.0441	0.370	-0.0097	0.862
<b>Terrorism</b>	<b>-0.1184</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.1782</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.1158</b>	<b>0.018</b>	-0.0706	0.204
<b>Culture</b>	<b>-0.1667</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.1857</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.1369</b>	<b>0.005</b>	<b>-0.1795</b>	<b>0.001</b>
Partial Correlation of Disposition with Measures of Justifications								
	All		Conservatives		Liberals		Neutral	
	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance
Law	<b>0.0676</b>	<b>0.027</b>	0.0692	0.218	0.0409	0.406	0.0894	0.108
Economy	0.0564	0.066	0.0183	0.745	0.0808	0.100	0.0769	0.167
Jobs	0.042	0.170	0.0332	0.554	0.0518	0.292	0.0415	0.457
Terrorism	-0.0334	0.275	0.026	0.643	-0.0469	0.341	-0.0352	0.528
Culture	0.0149	0.627	-0.0446	0.427	0.0643	0.191	0.0182	0.745
Partial Correlation of Aversion with Measures of Justifications								
	All		Conservatives		Liberals		Neutral	
	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance	Correlation	Significance
<b>Law</b>	<b>-0.1726</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.1654</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>-0.1209</b>	<b>0.014</b>	<b>-0.2337</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Economy	-0.0322	0.294	-0.0421	0.453	-0.0628	0.201	-0.0306	0.584
Jobs	-0.0533	0.082	-0.0377	0.502	-0.0696	0.156	-0.0645	0.247
Terrorism	0.0124	0.685	0.0063	0.910	-0.0238	0.629	0.0246	0.659
<b>Culture</b>	<b>-0.1699</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.1869</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.1773</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.1305</b>	<b>0.019</b>

Regardless of ideology the correlates to anxiety about illegal immigration are well correlated with culture, on a level of  $p < .001$  significance for conservatives,  $p < .005$  significance for liberals, and  $p < .001$  significance for ideologically neutral. The question implicated the positive nature of “diversity and richness of our culture” combined with a threat to break into separate cultures implicating the sort of balkanization that according to Alexseev drives the anti-immigrant sentiment. These data indicate that of the reasons for having an immigration policy, the risk to culture and the risks of terrorism are more associated with affect toward the illegal immigrant population.

Psychologist Fred Pincus argues that there are three necessary requirements to trigger prejudice against a group or category of people. There must be a belief/ideology about that group, a triggering of emotions, and a motivation to behave a certain way toward that group.<sup>24</sup> Is the prejudice against illegal immigrants initiated by racial prejudice, or is it the non-racial sentiment that there is a perceived fundamental unwillingness of illegal immigrants, particularly Hispanics, to assimilate? It could be, as Alexseev argues, that rather than anti-Hispanic sentiment, it is the fear of the tearing apart of the fabric of American society which drives antiimmigrant policy.<sup>25</sup> Professor Rodolfo O. de la Garza argues that there is good reason to think that racial affect is not driving the current immigration debates. The debate crosses traditional racial lines, including even traditionally restrictionist republican interests finding new constituencies in Latinos and Asians as well as a mobilized chamber of commerce.<sup>26</sup>

We ought not to be glib with charges of ‘nativism’ or ‘racism.’ Those who support restrictionist measures concerning illegal immigration argue that such terms slander their motives and shut down legitimate debate about a non-racial security issue.<sup>27</sup> They argue that their policies are neutral with regard to race, and that their principles apply evenly to all who break the law. While being careful not to impugn legitimate concerns about security and economics, historically restrictionist sentiment correlates with ‘nativist’ or even blatantly racist prejudice. I contend that it is important to ask

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<sup>24</sup> Race and Ethnic Conflict: Contending Views on Prejudice, Discrimination and Ethnoviolence Fred L. Pincus & Howard J. Ehrlich eds., 1994 pg. 49-50

<sup>25</sup> Bosniak, Linda S. “Nativism” The Concept some reflections” Immigrants out The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States Edited by Juan F. Perea 1997 pg. 287

<sup>26</sup> Rodolfo O. de la Garza Understanding Contemporary Immigration Debates: The Need for A Multidimensional Approach Jul 31, 2006

<sup>27</sup> Bosniak, Linda S. *ibid* pg 283

whether such features are focusing even legitimate concerns about immigrant intentions to bring about the sort of security dilemmas as described by Alexseev.

Taking as a starting point Kinder's claim that "racial prejudice infects contemporary political affairs in pervasive ways,"<sup>28</sup> in fact, principles (or values) are indispensable to adequate understanding of public opinion. When testing opinions about race, we must be careful to take into account the principles of the respondents, which may influence policy preferences. During the 1980s and 90s, political scientists debated the methodologies and principles behind measuring anti-black affect and its effect on policy. Two important viewpoints in this debate are those who argue for a symbolic racism thesis and their critics, who charge that these phenomena are conflicts over principle, not racial affect.

Symbolic racism theorists argue that because racism is no longer acceptable in the public square, anti-black affect presents through opposition to perceived violations of traditional values obtained from pre-adult socialization. These traditional values are "individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline." Hard work and diligent service is juxtaposed against "unfair" government interference, which alters the social situations of blacks who have obtained their position because of ethical or disciplinary failures.<sup>29</sup> The proponents of this theory argue that these traditional values act as symbols, or as a stand-in, for racial prejudice not openly expressed in the public sphere. Symbolic racism theory holds that direct material interests such as job

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<sup>28</sup> Kinder, D. R. "The continuing American dilemma: White resistance to racial change 40 years after Myrdal" *Journal of Social Issues* 42, pg. 168 1986

<sup>29</sup> Kinder, D. R. and D. O. Sears (1981). Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 40: 414-31.

availability or strain on public resources do not alone determine the motives for political behavior.

The critics of the symbolic racism thesis find that prejudice is one of many forces that underlie policy preference, and a majority of the preference can be explained by ideology. Debates over race are actually debates over conservative and liberal values.<sup>30</sup> Sniderman tests for a “covert racism” in which values serve as a “pretext” for treating blacks less well than whites (Sniderman et al. 1991 430-434).<sup>31</sup> He reasons that if the traditional values serve merely as a pretext, then symbolic racists would treat particularly harshly those blacks who violate traditional values. A series of studies found that this was not the case, therefore symbolic racism theory would not hold. My question is, then, what applicability do these concepts have for immigration?

While symbolic racism comes from the traditional values embodied in the Protestant Ethic, opposition to immigration, illegal or not, does not obviously comport with notions that fall under these traditional values.<sup>32</sup> While it is the case that immigration debates invoked government welfare, the direction is reversed, providing more for citizens rather than less. Restrictions question whether there will be room left in hospitals or public schools for the native citizens, after distributing to the newly arrived migrant population. This presupposes some level of appropriate government subsidization and responsibility toward the well-being of citizens that a purely conservative libertarian may not endorse. Fears of general disorder and crime aside,

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<sup>30</sup> Sniderman, P. Peffley, M. Hurwitz, J., (1997) "Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41:30-60.

<sup>31</sup> Sniderman P. M., Piazza T., Tetlock P. E., and Kendrick, A. (1991). "The New Racism," *American Journal of Political Science*, 35: pp.423-447.

<sup>32</sup> Kinder, D. R. (1986) The continuing American dilemma: White resistance to racial change 40 years after Myrdal. *Journal of Social Issues*, 42, 151-171

other concerns about illegal immigrants, in particular failures to assimilate or contribute to the national identity are perhaps more communitarian ideals than the markedly individualistic 'Protestant Ethic.'

Despite these potential differences in ideological background, claims in symbolic racist explanations of anti-black sentiment have parallels in immigration discourse. Much like the changed public sphere that no longer accepts openly racist ideology, immigration decisions based on the appearance of new immigrants or their race is not admitted when it once was. In contrast to the 1920's, when "racial inferiority" was a belief widely acknowledged by the media, today's environment is not conducive to traditional nativism.<sup>33</sup> This stated it is not that anti-Hispanic affect is not taking a toll; a 1997 study concluded, "opinions concerning the economic effects of immigration are best regarded as an amalgam of material concerns and more purely affective responses to particular ethnic groups."<sup>34</sup> Rather than policy that overtly prejudices immigrants, a symbolic racism hypothesis would predict prejudice expressed in defense of some set of conservative values seemingly unrelated to racial issues.

Recent ballot proposals that respond to the illegal immigration threat in Arizona demonstrate the implicit link between a set of conservative 'race neutral' values and restrictionist immigration sentiment. In this case, the conservative principles in question include such as restricting punitive damages from lawsuits, (litigation nation) and taking a hard line on crime. Arizona's Proposition 102 would prohibit a person who wins a civil lawsuit from receiving punitive damages if the person is present in this state in violation

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<sup>33</sup> Muller, Thomas *Nativism in the Mid-1990's Why Now? Immigrants out The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States* Edited by Juan F. Perea 1997 pg.109

<sup>34</sup> Citrin, Jack "Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform: The Role of economic Motivations," *Journal of Politics* 59, no. 3 August 1997:876-77)

of federal immigration law related to improper entry. Further, Proposition 100 prohibits bail for any person who is charged with a “serious felony offense” if the person is found to have entered or stayed in the U.S. illegally.<sup>35</sup>

While these positions are ideologically conservative, they do not seem, as with principled ideological stances on race, to stem from the ‘Protestant Ethic.’ These claims are culturally motivated, and may not even comport well with traditional political divisions. One common sentiment among restrictionists is that illegal immigration, and those seeking liberalized borders, is encouraged and sanctioned by “big business.” This sort of populist sentiment clashes with the conservative positions that endorse individualism and laissez-faire economics. Such clashes contributed to the temporary “blow up” of Senator John McCain presidential campaign and may contribute to shifts on immigration policy by the other leading Republican candidates as well.<sup>36</sup> These clashes will confound ideologies correlation with immigrant sentiment, especially when considering those who identify as conservatives.

To test the ideology mediation hypothesis, I propose that there will be an intervening relationship between ideology and the thermometer responses relationship to the various rationalizations; jobs, terrorism, economy and most importantly, culture. In these models, I have included three thermometer variables, ranging from 0 to 100: Hispanics, welfare recipients, and illegal immigrants. A response of 0 is “cold” a response of 100 is “warm” toward the group. The ideological leanings are distributed across a seven-point scale.

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<sup>35</sup> [http://www.azleg.state.az.us/2006\\_Ballot\\_Proposition\\_Analyses/](http://www.azleg.state.az.us/2006_Ballot_Proposition_Analyses/)

<sup>36</sup> Michael D. Shear Washington Post Staff Writer Immigration Stance Is Costly for McCain Thursday, June 28, 2007; Page A01

		Ideology							Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Non-Ideological	0	0	0	0	315	0	0	0	315
	1	56	171	162	0	128	185	36	738
Total		56	171	162	315	128	185	36	1,053

The thermometer results for illegal immigrants were significant for all political leanings and for all dependent variables in the five regression models; however, there was a pattern in the thermometer response for Hispanics as follows:

Thermometer response of Hispanics							
All				Conservatives			
	Coefficient	t value	p>  t		Coefficient	t value	p>  t
Jobs	0.0140	2.80	0.005	Jobs	0.0129	2.52	0.012
Culture	0.0172	3.08	0.002	Culture	0.0202	2.43	0.016
Law	0.0168	3.15	0.002	Law	0.0250	2.79	0.006
Economy	-0.0008	-0.16	0.876	Economy	-0.0066	-0.87	0.385
Terrorism	0.0067	1.28	0.200	Terrorism	0.0089	1.00	0.317
Liberal				Politically neutral			
	Coefficient	t value	p>  t		Coefficient	t value	p>  t
Jobs	0.022	2.42	0.016	Jobs	0.0035	0.38	0.706
Culture	0.0247	2.39	0.018	Culture	0.0079	0.7	0.482
Law	0.0212	2.36	0.019	Law	0.0052	0.49	0.624
Economy	0.0155	1.61	0.109	Economy	-0.0097	-0.92	0.356
Terrorism	0.011	1.22	0.223	Terrorism	-0.0002	-0.02	0.983

In these regressions, the coefficients on the variable relating thermometer responses about Hispanics and the dependent variables jobs, culture and law are statistically significant for those who measure themselves with a political ideology in either direction. This was not the case for the economy variable or the terrorism variable, which did not have any statistically significant correlation with thermometer



results for Hispanics, regardless of ideological leaning. For the former three variables, these data indicate that there is a mediating relationship between ideological questions and responses on thermometer ratings for Hispanics.

For those who do not self-identify with the conservative-liberal ideological divide, there is no correlation between anti-Hispanic affect and rationales for immigration positions. These individuals would not necessarily have or not have any particular sentiment; but rather, they would be less likely to report such sentiment consistently if it corresponds with hard line policy positions on illegal immigration.

Correlation of Anxiety with Thermometer reading on Hispanics

	Non-Neutral	Neutral
Pearsons Correlation	-0.270	-0.143
Significance	0.000	0.009
N	758	335

While there is an equivocation in public opinion between illegal immigrants and Hispanics, these data imply that for those with neutral ideological tendencies there is a propensity to misrepresent anxiety of illegal immigrants with Hispanic affect in order to avoid the perception of racist policy advocacy. Those with ideological leanings can filter anti-Hispanic affect into a coherent system of ethical and political claims that obscure the affective origins of the political rationales. The respondents' tendency to place such affect as adherence to a larger ideological system mitigates the tendency to misrepresent the extent of anti-Hispanic affect driving their policy preferences.

The statistically correct way to measure such an interaction is to use an interaction variable in the model itself. For example, we take a new variable for whether the

respondent was ideological, 1 if they were, 0 if they had no ideological leanings, and multiply that with the thermometer response in the following model.

$\text{Culture} = \text{thermometer for illegal aliens} + \text{thermometer for Hispanics} + \text{thermometer for illegal aliens} * \text{non-ideological} + \text{ideology} + \text{non-ideological} * \text{Hispanic thermometer} + \text{age} + \text{Education} + \text{South} + \text{border state} + \text{treatment} + \text{Democrat} + \text{Republican} + \text{immigration knowledge} + \text{Estimate of illegal} + \text{Estimate of incoming illegal}$

Regression printout to find Interaction effect on Culture			Number of obs= 1304	
			F( 15, 1288)= 63.56	
			Prob > F = 0.0000	
			R-squared = 0.4253	
			Adj R-squared=0.4187	
			Root MSE = 2.8549	
	Coefficient	Std. Error	T	P> t
Illegal thermometer	-0.07066	0.003742	-18.88	0.000
Hispanic thermometer	-0.00145	0.006465	-0.22	0.823
Non-Ideological*Hispanic Therm	-0.0154	0.007575	-2.03	0.042
Ideology (seven point)	0.285359	0.065741	4.34	0.000
Ideologue (0 or 1)	0.901089	0.550516	1.64	0.102
Age	0.162856	0.056203	2.9	0.004
Education	-0.41784	0.107384	-3.89	0.000
Live in South	-0.11475	0.164651	-0.7	0.486
Live in Border state	0.380693	0.162453	2.34	0.019
Treatment	0.01699	0.167547	0.1	0.919
Democrat	-0.6387	0.198246	-3.22	0.001
Republican	0.30217	0.220525	1.37	0.171
Knowledge of Illegal immigration	-0.08025	0.066337	-1.21	0.227
Over-estimate of those here	0.17615	0.094856	1.86	0.064
Over-estimate of those coming	0.048468	0.07993	0.61	0.544
Constant	10.64918	0.716012	14.87	0.000

This model shows, in statistical terms, that there is a significant interaction effect between being non-ideological and the correlation of Hispanic thermometer responses

and culture. The following partial derivative of the regression model with respect to the thermometer variable describes the effect of Hispanic thermometer responses on culture.

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial \text{thermometer}} = -.00145 - .0154 * \text{non} - \text{neutral}$$

Non-ideologues, who will have a zero response in the model, will only have the statistically insignificant -.00145 as the effect. Those with ideology, however, have a statistically significant .0154 unit decrease in the strength of the threat of culture for every 1-point increase in the warmth reported for Hispanics. In other words, the more those with ideology like Hispanics, the less likely they are to respond that illegal immigration is a threat to culture, whereas the same is not the case for those who responded neutral on the ideology scale. I argue that this is evidence for a psychological theory that racial prejudice infects contemporary political affairs in pervasive ways, but that this phenomena does not obtain in situations where there is not an ideological framework to sort affective responses into policy positions. The following table outlines the coefficients for each of the relevant dependent rationales.

**Effect of Thermometer responses on Reasons for Non-Neutrals**

	Effect	Joint probability	p>  t
$\frac{\partial \text{Jobs}}{\partial \text{thermometer}}$	-0.01486	F( 2, 1288) = 6.06	Prob > F = 0.0024
$\frac{\partial \text{Culture}}{\partial \text{thermometer}}$	-0.01685	F( 2, 1288) = 6.43	Prob > F = 0.0017
$\frac{\partial \text{Law}}{\partial \text{thermometer}}$	-0.01502	F( 2, 1288) = 5.93	Prob > F = 0.0027
$\frac{\partial \text{Economy}}{\partial \text{thermometer}}$	-0.01382	F( 2, 1293) = 1.99	Prob > F = 0.1366
$\frac{\partial \text{Terrorism}}{\partial \text{thermometer}}$	-0.00414	F( 3, 1290) = 0.80	Prob > F = 0.4946

Noticing that this measurement of the effect of thermometer responses has the same significant variables for the dependent variables of Jobs, Culture and Law, and the same insignificant effects for the variables of the Economy and Terrorism variables as the previous separated group analysis. The F tests for these effects was done on a joint hypothesis test because of high multicollinearity when testing for a variance inflation factor (Non-Ideology and the interaction term each a Variance Inflation Factor value >10). These differences in the effects for different rationales do not comport with previous work dealing with African American racial policy, particularly Sniderman, Crosby and Howell, who found that prejudices' interaction with ideology is uniform across racially implicated policies, rather than varying according to the policy area.<sup>37</sup> One explanation for the failure of the interaction variable to be significant for terrorism and economy is that the respondents did not consider the racial nature of these particular rationales. A further finding of Sniderman, Crosby and Howell is that there should be disproportionate importance for racial affect for liberals, rather than conservatives, the former of whose policies are driven by a combination of ideology and racial affect. Rather, this model indicates that there is an interaction between ideology and affect, but that this difference may not be solely between liberals and conservatives as it was for the studies of African American aimed policy.

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<sup>37</sup> Sniderman, P.M. Crosby, G.C., Howell, W. G. "The Politics of Race" *Racialized Politics* 2000, eds. Sears, Sidanius, Bobo pg 236-237

## PROBLEMS AND CONCLUSION

One main concern one has whenever embarking on a study of racial affect and its relationship to policy is whether or not we can get respondents to demonstrate their actual beliefs of the matter, or whether the questions themselves interfere too much with getting objective access to the opinions of the respondents, something Sniderman et al. calls intrusiveness. Besides measurement problems of racial affect, it may be difficult to separate in the minds of the average respondent the differences between anti-Hispanic affect and anti-illegal immigrant affect, where one may be read as the other, and a problem of endogeneity ensues. The model attempts to fix some of this by including a variable for affect toward illegal immigration, albeit using a relatively crude thermometer response.

A second problem is the crudeness of the ideology measure. With a seven-point scale, it is not clear what a “neutral” response means in relation to immigration debate's ideological issues. A more substantive ideological measure may help adjudicate whether it is ideological sophistication or particular ideological positions captured by the non-neutral responses that allow (or excuses) significant relationships between racial affect and the rationales associate with the risks of illegal immigration. Nevertheless, as it stands, there is significant reason to think that ideology is not playing a straightforward role in this model.

Ideology, on my proposed hypothesis, subsidizes the search to cover the effect of racial affect on our policy. Those without this cognitive tool are unable to dissociate their racial affect and their policy preferences, and are therefore less likely to have a significant correlation between their thermometer responses and their particular concerns

of illegal immigration. The data indicates that with similar intensity, both liberals and conservatives use the tool of ideology that can place their racial affect in a system of beliefs on policy, resulting in what for them is policy that does not reflect their racial affect but rather their principled or reasoned reaction to real threat.

While the data is not refined enough to explain the mechanism of this mediation in existing ideological systems, I propose that there are structural features of both sides of the ideological spectrum that may contribute. Conservative ideology may criticize, for example, the unfairness in distribution of public goods to illegal immigrants who did not follow the laws of the land or worry about the government's ability to protect the security of its citizens in favor of considerations of cultural or racial sensitivity. Liberal ideology may have concerns about the abuse of workers by unlicensed and unregulated industry or abuses at the border itself by unscrupulous "coyotes." There are further concerns about wages of disadvantaged American workers or for privileging illegal immigrants over asylum seekers, both of which appeal to various facets of traditional liberal ideology. Compare the debate to that over free trade, as both Democratic candidates in the 2008 primary sent out mailers denouncing each other's presumed support for NAFTA.<sup>38</sup> There are reasons on both sides of the ideological spectrum to be concerned about illegal immigration, and these reasons give room to express our attitudes, entering the public discourse in the form of principled policy positions.

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<sup>38</sup> New York Times "It must be Ohio" February 24, 2008 nytimes.com editorial

**APPENDIX:****PARTIAL CORRELATIONS TO SHOW PAIRINGS OF RATIONALES**

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Corr.		0.303	0.282	0.185	0.194	0.036	0.005	<b>-0.153</b>	0.087	0.046
	Sig.		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.060	0.808	0.000	0.000	0.015
2	Corr.	0.303		0.188	0.142	0.187	<b>-0.033</b>	0.002	0.002	0.098	0.054
	Sig.	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.081	0.930	0.904	0.000	0.005
3	Corr.	0.282	0.188		0.246	0.304	0.033	0.018	0.088	0.087	<b>-0.206</b>
	Sig.	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.086	0.343	0.000	0.000	0.000
4	Corr.	0.185	0.142	0.246		0.242	-0.014	<b>-0.102</b>	0.052	-0.009	0.109
	Sig.	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.470	0.000	0.006	0.636	0.000
5	Corr.	0.194	0.187	0.304	0.242		0.023	0.039	0.085	<b>-0.203</b>	0.062
	Sig.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.233	0.044	0.000	0.000	0.001
6	Corr.	0.036	<b>-0.033</b>	0.033	-0.014	0.023		0.295	0.272	0.139	0.235
	Sig.	0.060	0.081	0.086	0.470	0.233		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
7	Corr.	0.005	0.002	0.018	<b>-0.102</b>	0.039	0.295		0.214	0.194	0.334
	Sig.	0.808	0.930	0.343	0.000	0.044	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000
8	Corr.	<b>-0.153</b>	0.002	0.088	0.052	0.085	0.272	0.214		0.154	0.255
	Sig.	0.000	0.904	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
9	Corr.	0.087	0.098	0.087	-0.009	<b>-0.203</b>	0.139	0.194	0.154		0.166
	Sig.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.636	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000
10	Corr.	0.046	0.054	<b>-0.206</b>	0.109	0.062	0.235	0.334	0.255	0.166	
	Sig.	0.015	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	

1      Allowing any illegal immigrants to become citizens sets a bad precedent by rewarding people for breaking the law.

2      The government should not make things worse for those struggling economically by allowing millions of illegal immigrants to compete for jobs.

3      We cannot afford the taxes necessary to provide services like education and health care for illegal immigrants.

4      If illegal immigration trends continue, English will no longer be our common language. Without a common language, the U.S. will break into separate cultures.

5      The large flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. makes it easy for terrorists to enter the country unchallenged.

6      Most illegal immigrants are highly motivated people who contribute to the economy through hard work, often in jobs that citizens do not want.

7      America has always been a nation of immigrants, with each new wave adding to the diversity and richness of our culture. The most recent wave of immigrants is no different.

8      Allowing some illegal immigrants to eventually become citizens recognizes that most of them are otherwise law-abiding neighbors.

9      Terrorism and illegal immigration are completely different issues, with completely different solutions.

10     Illegal immigrants pay taxes like the rest of us, so they should be able to get services like education and health care.

# QUESTION WORDING AND FORMULA

LQ34: Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statement.

**1 agree - 7 disagree**

**Variable = (8-A) + B**

Variable Name : Law

A. Allowing any illegal immigrants to become citizens sets a bad precedent by rewarding people for breaking the law.

B. Allowing some illegal immigrants to eventually become citizens recognizes that most of them are otherwise law-abiding neighbors.

Variable Name : Jobs

A. The government should not make things worse for those struggling economically by allowing millions of illegal immigrants to compete for jobs.

B. Most illegal immigrants are highly motivated people who contribute to the economy through hard work, often in jobs that citizens do not want.

Variable Name : Terrorism

A. The large flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. makes it easy for terrorists to enter the country unchallenged.

B. Terrorism and illegal immigration are completely different issues, with completely different solutions.

Variable Name : Economy

A. We cannot afford the taxes necessary to provide services like education and health care for illegal immigrants.

B. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statement. Illegal immigrants pay taxes like the rest of us, so they should be able to get services like education and health care.

Variable Name : Culture

A. If illegal immigration trends continue, English will no longer be our common language. Without a common language, the U.S. will break into separate cultures.



- B. America has always been a nation of immigrants, with each new wave adding to the diversity and richness of our culture. The most recent wave of immigrants is no different.